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Power-Sharing in the Local Arena:  
Man – a Rebel-Held Town in Western  
Côte d’Ivoire 
Kathrin Heitz  
Abstract: In general, peace agreements with power-sharing provisions are 
analysed at a national level. This article offers insights into the practices of 
power-sharing in the local arena of western Côte d’Ivoire, in the town of 
Man. It investigates what brought about a change towards peace in the re-
gion of Man and then presents local forms of power-sharing between the 
community leaders and the rebels who have established a rather complex 
system of domination and taxation in the territory they occupy. Moreover, 
the implementation of a territorial power-sharing device, which is part of the 
peace agreement negotiated among the warring parties at the national level, 
is analysed: the redeployment of state administration to the rebel-held zones 
of the country. The ethnographic data on which the article is based reveals 
that the actors at the local level have their own strategies to address urgent 
needs and that they play a more active role in peacemaking than is usually ac-
knowledged. 
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In his latest book, internationally renowned political scientist Patrick Chabal 
makes a strong case for turning to the local, i.e. the ground level, in order to 
search for complementary elements for our reflection on and understanding 
of politics in Africa (Chabal 2009: x-xi, 30). In the same way, this article aims 
at shedding light from a local angle on an issue that is usually dealt with at a 
national level, namely power-sharing. Armed conflicts are fought at a local 
level and this is where solutions for peace, such as power-sharing arrange-
ments, ultimately have to be implemented. I shall argue and demonstrate 
that the local political arena a) is the key for a better assessment of political 
strategies decided at the national level and b) plays a much more active role 
in peacemaking than is commonly acknowledged. The empirical data for this 
argument draw on long-term field research which was conducted for the 
author’s PhD study in the rebel-held city of Man, the main New Forces1-
controlled town in western Côte d’Ivoire.  
After an introduction to the history and dynamics of the conflict as well 
as conceptual and methodological considerations, the article explores 
whether peace agreements negotiated among national actors with interna-
tional mediators are able to address concerns at the local level. I look at the 
local perception of the peace process and ask what the relevant steps to-
wards peace were in the local arena. Then, I focus on two forms of power-
sharing: First of all, I describe local forms of power-sharing, which have 
been negotiated autonomously – independent of national peace accords – 
among local actors. In a second step, I focus on territorial power-sharing, 
namely the redeployment of state administration to the rebel-held parts of 
Côte d’Ivoire and ask what it means when rebels and state-appointed pre-
fects have to live and work side by side. In the conclusion, power-sharing at 
the national level and forms of power-sharing in the local arena are juxta-
posed.2 
Conceptual and Methodological Considerations 
In the last decade, power-sharing has become Western peacemakers’ pre-
ferred tool for ending wars (Roeder and Rothchild 2005: 5; Tull and Mehler 
2008: 376). The literature on power-sharing has developed three strands of 
analysis: A first strand focuses on so-called (ethnically) divided societies or 
                                                 
1  Forces Nouvelles, New Forces or FN hereafter. I will also use rebels/ex-rebels to refer 
to the same violent non-state actor. 
2  I would like to thank the following scholars for their comments on previous ver-
sions of this article: Kerstin Bauer, Sadia Chérif, Gregor Dobler, Till Förster, Kone 
Gnangadjomon, Andreas Mehler, Christian von Soest and two anonymous review-
ers. Nevertheless, I remain fully responsible for the text. 
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post-war constitutions (e.g. Lijphart 1977; O’Flynn and Russel 2005; Noel 
2005). A second strand looks at power-sharing in peace negotiations (e.g. 
Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Sriram 2008; Mehler 2008, 2009), whereas a third 
strand of research has come to link the two and analyse the durability of 
peace agreements with power-sharing elements and long-term implications 
for sustainable peace and democracy (e.g. Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jar-
stad 2008). This article is a contribution to the second strand of research, 
namely to power-sharing in peace settlements.  
In their research, Hartzell and Hoddie transferred and applied the con-
cepts of power-sharing based on the classic book of Arend Lijphart to the 
context of peace settlements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 319). Power-shar-
ing provisions in peace settlements are used as incentives to bring the war-
ring parties at the negotiation table to end violence (Sriram 2008: 184). They 
also function as encouragements to belligerents to undertake “costly” steps 
in a balanced and therefore secured environment (Hoddie and Hartzell 
2003: 304-305). A costly step is, for example, disarmament. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
power-sharing is used in the peace agreements in a temporary way and not 
at a constitutional level as, for example, in Burundi (Sriram 2008: 55). To 
think about the Ivorian peace process in terms of costly signalling helps to 
understand the small, cautious steps that Ivorian actors make in the current 
situation. 
Literature on peacemaking3 and power-sharing often lacks data taken 
from the local level and practitioners fail to address local dynamics and their 
security concerns in peace agreements (Mehler 2008: 6, 2009: 472). There-
fore, scholars have recommended that there should be more attention paid 
to the local level during all phases of conflict (e.g. Mehler 2008: 38). In order 
to be empirically open to forms of power-sharing in the local arena, I will 
use power-sharing in a very broad and basic sense (Sriram 2008: iv), namely 
that one party gives up some of its power and shares it with another party, 
so that more people can have a say in and thus influence public affairs in a 
community.4 Defined in this way, there are more studies that describe forms 
of power-sharing at the local or at least at the regional level in a peace proc-
ess, see for example Georg Klute’s studies on northern Mali (Klute and von 
Trotha 2004). 
                                                 
3  See Chetail (2009: 1) for a distinction of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-
building. 
4  Compare with Hartzell and Hoddie’s definition: “power-sharing institutions as 
those rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups 
within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state re-
sources, among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 
320). 
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In the literature on peacebuilding, the necessity of involving the local 
level has become a much-cited desideratum (Pouligny 2009: 175). However, 
“local” is an ambiguous and context-dependent term that needs clarification. 
The way “local” is frequently used in discourses of peacemaking is as “local 
versus international” (Jarstad 2008: 107). Here, “local” refers to the stake-
holders from the country at war, the national actors are distinguished from 
outside or international actors. This is in the context that national actors 
have to be involved in peace negotiations in order to assure that agreements 
are reached locally rather than imposed from outside by the international 
community. Whereas in the just mentioned discourse “local” equals “na-
tional”, I will use the terms “local versus national” as opposites in this arti-
cle. In this sense, local is frequently used in the social sciences in general; for 
example, in Chabal’s book mentioned at the beginning (Chabal 2009: 30), in 
literature on power-sharing (Mehler 2008: 38), as well as in discourses on 
statehood from a socio-anthropological perspective (Förster 2006: 56).5 It is 
important to note that in the context of today’s power-sharing arrangement 
between state and non-state actors in Côte d’Ivoire, “local” does not equal 
“non-state”, neither is “national” synonymous with “the State”.6 What is 
meant by “local” as a counterpart to “national” is based on the observation 
that actors coming from the capital city, which is the heart of the national 
scene, are often perceived as outsiders when they visit places remote from 
the capital (Pouligny 2009: 175). If we do not want to neglect ordinary peo-
ple’s lives in the local arena outside the capital, we have to ask what is salient 
for them and look at social reality from an ordinary actor’s point of view.  
For this change of perspective, we shall leave the central government’s 
scene and zoom down to the main town of a region in the Ivorian hinter-
land, called Man. The authorities here do not usually appear on the national 
scene and are rarely present in media coverage. In peace negotiations, they 
are represented only by the top-ranks of their hierarchies. In the local arena, 
however, they are the king of the castle. When I talk about the local level or 
the local arena, I refer to the town of Man and its surroundings (see foot-
note 10 below). Corresponding to this, local actors are residents of this area.  
The empirical data for this article is based on my first long-term field 
research for my on-going PhD project, in which I look at security, trust and 
                                                 
5  For a theoretical discussion of the relationship between local, national and global 
from an anthropologists’ perspective see Appadurai, Arjun (2008), Modernity at 
Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation, Minneapolis (Minn.): University of 
Minnesota Press.  
6  I owe this point of clarification to the comment of an anonymous reviewer. 
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socio-political orders in Man.7 The methodological approach of my research 
is qualitative and inductive and orients itself on grounded theory. Most of 
the data was collected in the period between September 2008 and April 
2009, including a short trip in August 2009. The material presented here is 
mainly based on interviews8 with actors from a wide range of social groups9 
in the area of study, which is primarily the town of Man and zone six of the 
New Forces.10 Additional information was collected by systematic observa-
tion of specific events. The contextualisation of the data is based on the 
regular reading of the news and the systematic study of a local newspaper, 
Le Tambour, which was published during the war in Man, as well as with 
participation in everyday life. During the exploratory phase of my field re-
search, I came across local forms of power-sharing between the rebels and 
the civilians in Man that shall be described in this paper. 
The Violent Crisis in Western Côte d’Ivoire 
In the context of a difficult economic environment, causes for the outbreak 
of the Ivorian armed conflict must be searched for in the power vacuum 
following the death, after more than 30 years of rule, of the country’s first 
President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. The struggle for his succession 
led to fierce competition among the candidates from the three main political 
parties (PDCI, RDR, FPI)11. A discussion was launched about Ivoirité (an 
ideology of Ivorian citizenship) geared towards excluding in particular the 
                                                 
7  My PhD project is part of a comparative study “Regaining Trust in Post-Conflict 
Societies”, conducted by Kerstin Bauer, Gregor Dobler, Till Förster and myself. It 
is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). 
8  Most of the data was collected with semi-structured interviews, about 120 of which 
have been recorded, and with roughly 150 informal talks (including follow-up talks) 
which were written down immediately after the talks. 
9  In the course of my research, I made contact with roughly three hundred people. 
The aim was not to reach a representative number, but to get qualitative data from 
the widest range possible. Included are representatives of neighbourhoods, villages 
and religious groups; as well as young people, women, economic actors, state-repre-
sentatives, politicians, civil servants, foreigners, UN staff, and about fifty combat-
ants of the New Forces, ten of them in leading positions.  
10  Man is the capital of the New Forces’ zone six. The bulk of my data stems from 
Man. The data was completed with shorter trips and interviews held within the area 
of domination of the zone commander, stretching from the Liberian and Guinean 
border to Sémien and Kouibly to the East, as well as from Logoualé and Podi-
agouiné towards the South to villages in the North of Man. 
11  Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 
(PDCI-RDA), Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR); Front Populaire Ivoirien 
(FPI). 
  114 Kathrin Heitz 
 
RDR candidate from the elections; he represents the marginalised northern, 
Muslim population of the country, who have close historical links with 
populations in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Mali as well as the many 
immigrants from other Sahelian countries (Akindès 2004: 26-33). After an-
other round of unfair elections in 2000 and the gradual militarisation of 
politics (Le Pape and Vidal 2002), the Ivorian civil war began on 19 Sep-
tember 2002. A handful of exiled military men formed the rebel movement 
Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) which aimed to fight for a fairer 
political order and to depose President Laurent Gbagbo (FPI). The coup 
failed, but they instantly managed to occupy two major towns in the North, 
Korhogo and Bouaké.12  
Two months later, on 28 November 2002, the western parts bordering 
Liberia and Guinea were seized by two new rebel movements, the Mouvement 
pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand 
Ouest (MPIGO), the latter of which was dominated by foreign mercenaries 
(HRW 2003: 12). All three rebel groups soon afterwards continued as one 
group under the name of the New Forces (see footnote 1 above). Repre-
sentatives of the FN today say that these two groups had been created to 
continue the territorial conquest towards the South without breaching the 
cessation of hostilities that the MPCI had agreed on with the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in October 2002.13 The fact 
that there were three rebel movements at the beginning of the conflict has 
no considerable influence on the situation and rebel structure in the West 
today.14  
Until today, the western parts of Côte d’Ivoire, which include the re-
gions of Man, the capital of the Dix-Huit Montagnes, and the region 
Moyen-Cavally, are considered to be the most unsafe and unstable parts of 
the country, also due to the fact that they share borders with Liberia and 
Guinea (ICG 2009). Sometimes this part of the country is referred to as the 
“Wild West”. This alludes to the fact that the West has experienced more 
violence than any other part of the country, which is also due to a Liberiani-
sation of the conflict (Ero and Marshall 2003). It seems, however, to make 
sense to distinguish between a northern and a southern West. Ethnically 
motivated violence, which the West often stands for, has played a much 
bigger role in the demilitarised zone and the South than in the rebel-held, 
                                                 
12  The seizure of Abidjan, the economic centre, failed. 
13  Personal communication, December 2008. 
14  Nevertheless, in committees located at the national level, such as the Independent 
Electoral Commission, the FN have been able to maintain three times the number 
of seats that they had during the Linas-Marcoussis peace negotiations at the begin-
ning of 2003. 
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northern part of the West. The northern region suffered from heavy battles 
between the government and the rebels and the subsequent looting and 
sexual violence by armed men. After Man was taken for the first time by the 
rebels, in November 2002, it was re-conquered by the government, so-called 
loyalists, shortly afterwards. On 19 December 2002, after two weeks of 
severe fighting with the government forces, Man fell into the hands of the 
rebels, under whose control it remains.  
After several rounds of negotiations, the direct fighting ceased in the 
first half of 2003. A demarcation line, which has been controlled by French 
peacekeepers since its installation, divided the country into two halves. The 
population has lived in a no-peace-no-war situation ever since (Engels 2007: 
16). The South is controlled by forces loyal to the government under Presi-
dent Laurent Gbagbo (FPI). In the northern and western parts, the rebellion 
has succeeded in destroying the state’s monopoly of force over its territory. 
Roughly 60 per cent of the country is now controlled by the rebel group 
New Forces. Many of the state’s institutions were targeted; some of the 
buildings were physically destroyed and most of the personnel fled to the 
South. The state institutions ceased functioning: the armed forces, the po-
lice, the gendarmerie, the court system, the corps of prefects, the customs 
service, water and forest divisions as well as large sections of the school 
system, the conseil général15, and the mairie.16 The void was gradually filled by a 
structure that groups of armed men put in place. 
The rebel-held part of Côte d’Ivoire is today divided into ten loosely 
linked zones (ICG 2009: 12), each of which is headed by a military governor 
or zone commander, called comzone. The structure can be described as an 
authoritarian military administration, with a patrimonial network, although 
some personnel were also recruited, based on account of merit and brother-
hood, during the war. Since the FN had not managed to overthrow Presi-
dent Gbagbo, they had to find a way to generate income in the territory that 
they occupied. They started to systematically raise trade taxes on all busi-
nesses in their zones, taxes which have made the commanders and their 
entourage rich. The order that emerged demonstrates a pronounced image 
of the well-known tendencies which social scientists have described con-
cerning the state of power and domination in Africa. Based on observations 
and accounts from combatants and non-combatants, I will now describe the 
order in zone 6 (Man) which is divided into a northern and southern sec-
tor.17 
                                                 
15  Encompasses a department in Côte d’Ivoire, the president of the council is elected. 
16  Encompasses a town council and its communities, the mayor is elected. 
17  Comparative studies have revealed that local conditions shaped the rebel govern-
ance that emerged (Bauer, Dobler and Förster 2007). 
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The highest rebel in the zone is the zone commander Losseni Fofana, 
called “Loss” or “Papa Cobra”. He was a corporal in the Ivorian army; to-
day he is a commander by rank. He has a second in command, and his right 
hand is the chief of security, called Cobra whose name was given to the 
military unit as a whole. Most of the high-ranking commanders are former 
military men; many of the low-ranking rebels are so-called débrouilleurs18, 
who had enjoyed casual employment, if any at all, before the crisis. To ease 
tensions with the populace, the New Forces’ commanders in zone 6 made 
use of and created organs, in which the non-military population is 
represented. Apart from this civil branch, the financial and military power 
are the pillars on which their domination rests. A prison and gendarmerie 
and police stations were opened with their personnel. There are parts of the 
population who choose to benefit from these institutions in cases of dispute 
with business partners or with family members, whereas others would never 
consider addressing them. What is lacking most in terms of civilian security 
and justice is a separate judicial body. Often “right is might” and people call 
it the law of the jungle or law of the strongest.19 
                                                
Another main actor that has to be taken into consideration in order to 
understand the balance of power in the local arena is the international 
peacekeeping force. The French military operation Licorne has been present 
to separate the two sides of belligerents since the violent outbreak of the 
crisis and later became part of the Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire 
(ONUCI) as a support and rapid-intervention force. In April 2004, the 
ONUCI started working with military observers and police deployment, but 
without an executive mandate. This limits their scope of action decisively. 
UN staff working on the ground mainly observe and write reports to be sent 
off to the headquarters where decisions will be made and then implemented 
top-down. A large portion of the population is often unaware of these pro-
cedures and does not understand why the UN does not intervene more. 
Although it is not always easy to prove, the presence of the UN and the 
French has an effect on the rebels’ behaviour: the population has somebody 
to complain to and the FN feel they are being watched by the international 
community. 
 
18  A débrouilleur is a person without regular income who lives by his or her wits. 
19  The description concerning the provision and non-provision of public goods could 
be continued here, but does not relate to the issue of power sharing. 
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Power-Sharing Provisions in Two Peace 
Agreements at the National Level 
Efforts to negotiate peace began soon after the onset of the violent crisis 
(Mehler 2008: 23). The ups and downs of the peace negotiation process of 
Côte d’Ivoire with a special focus on power-sharing arrangements can be 
found in Mehler’s comparison of several peace agreements in Africa (Mehler 
2008: 23-26). The first large-scale agreement was the Linas-Marcoussis peace 
agreement.20 It addressed many key issues of the conflict (citizenship and 
land ownership) and included power-sharing arrangements, such as a com-
mon government. In the eyes of President Gbagbo, power was distributed 
in an unbalanced way, for the rebels were to get the Defence and the Inte-
rior Ministries which would give them too much control in security issues. 
The Marcoussis-agreement lacked clear power-sharing formulas concerning 
the reunification of the national territory and the future army. Although the 
agreement failed, it must be acknowledged that it was negotiated at an early 
phase of the violent conflict and helped to reduce direct armed confronta-
tion. The second peace agreement we will turn to now was negotiated four 
years later when the conflict was at a stalemate.  
After negotiations lead by the ECOWAS, France and the South African 
President Thabo Mbeki on behalf of the African Union, the Ouagadougou 
Peace Agreement (OPA), signed on 4 March 200721, was initiated by the 
protagonists themselves: first, the agreement was suggested by President 
Laurent Gbagbo, and then the Secretary-General of the New Forces Kigba-
fori Guillaume Soro accepted the proposition. The peace talks were soon 
called “direct dialogue” and were facilitated by Blaise Compaoré, the Presi-
dent of Burkina Faso and chairman of ECOWAS. The rebels had prepared 
themselves in his country and he still maintains close ties with the leaders of 
the rebellion. In a second step, a permanent framework of concertation 
including the two main party leaders and candidates for the Presidency, 
Bedié (PDCI) and Ouattara (RDR), as well as international actors, was set 
up. Furthermore, an Evaluation and Monitoring Committee chaired by the 
mediator for periodic evaluation started working with monthly meetings. 
The agreement negotiated between Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume 
Soro yielded much hope. This first accord was followed by four supple-
                                                 
20  French text of the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accord from <http://www.diplomatie. 
gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/cote-ivoire_339/colonne-droite_1347/textes-refer 
ence_1348/accord-linas-marcoussis_1636.html> (accessed: 7 October 2009). 
21  French text of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord from <http://www.operationspaix. 
net/IMG/pdf/Accord_politic_ouagadougou_2007-03-05_.pdf > (accessed: 12 July 
2009). 
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mentary accords. Important components of the agreement and the accords 
that followed are:  
 
 the dismantlement of the demarcation line “confidence zone”, which 
separated the belligerents 
 the formation of a new common government with the FN Secretary-
General Soro serving as its Prime Minister (political power-sharing)  
 the initiation of first steps to address the conflict’s key issues: Ivorian 
citizenship and legitimacy of power  
 the redeployment of state administration to the rebel-held parts of the 
country 
 the creation of mixed units in the Integrated Command Centre (military 
power-sharing)22 
 
Initially and on a national level, the OPA was able to bring about change 
towards peace and normalisation. On 26 March 2007, Guillaume Soro be-
came Prime Minister of the new government, in April the dismantlement of 
the demarcation line was started by progressively replacing the international 
peacekeepers with mixed Ivorian units. This meant the end of the separation 
and complete freedom of circulation within the entire country. However, at 
a local level in the North, the OPA has not had the same resonance and 
impact. Two years after the signing of the agreement, not much has changed 
for people in the northern part, for the rebels are still in control.  
Doubts have sprung up concerning the willingness to implement the 
agreement in costly domains. Symbolic acts and verbal reassurances cannot 
hide the fact that genuine actions are being postponed to often unknown 
subsequent dates. Major issues of citizenship, the electoral process, the dis-
armament, demobilisation and reinsertion (DDR) of combatants, the merg-
ing of the army as well as the genuine reunification of the administration still 
remain unsolved.  
To analyse why this might be so, I consider Hoddie and Hartzell’s ap-
proach useful. They argue that in the aftermath of a violent conflict, there is 
a lot of distrust among the former warring parties and in order to overcome 
distrust, “costly signals demonstrating their genuine interest in peace” are 
required (2003: 304-305). The lack of mutual trust between the belligerents 
has been widely recognised (ICG 2009: 9-15). Time and again, commanders 
in zone 6 (Man) say that they have heard of new recruitment of groups and 
training on the Liberian side of the border, loyal to the South. As long as 
this apprehension persists, they will not relinquish their means of coercion 
                                                 
22  See also Mehler 2008: 19. 
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to the state administration. Indeed, to relinquish protection, such as disar-
mament, is arguably the most difficult or costly step (Sriram 2008: 22) and 
therefore needs much reassurance or mutual steps to balance it. 
Many point their fingers at the zone commanders who do not seem 
ready to leave and therefore make a genuine re-unification impossible. How-
ever, if the zone commanders step down, the FN zones, together with their 
security and taxation system, would be dissolved. Consequently, the com-
manders of the New Forces would lose their territory, military power and 
their source of income; in short, their territorial, military and economic 
standing. This step is very, if not too, costly; there seems to be no gain from 
power-sharing devices intended to counterbalance this. It presupposes that 
the FN would fully trust that the Gbagbo camp will keep its word and or-
ganise fair elections or could rely on the third-party guarantor. The rebel 
leaders cannot give up power because there are not enough power-sharing 
devices to counterbalance their loss of power before the elections are held. 
As long as this is so, the best way to go for local people is to engage in local 
power-sharing arrangements with the New Forces. 
National Peace Agreements in the  
Local Perception 
The Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement, signed in January 2003, gained 
much attention in the national and international press; in what follows, I 
shall examine its reception in the local arena. The space of time in which the 
agreement falls is remembered as temps sauvage, barbaric times. It was still a 
time of direct confrontation: battles between the loyalists and the rebels, as 
well as violent confrontations among rival rebel groups. It was also a time 
dominated by severe physical threat, many fled to the South or to nearby 
villages, if they could. But even in the villages they were not safe, so they 
had to sleep in encampments or simply out in the bush. Some experienced 
or witnessed horrible scenes. There are areas that were bombed, and merce-
naries from the sub-region, as well as Ivorians, looted the area, raped 
women and killed civilians.23 
Since the rebel-held areas were cut off from the commercial capital in 
the South, newspapers hardly reached the north-western parts. A local jour-
nalist, Balla Doumbia, therefore created a newspaper called Le Tambour. Its 
first issue was published on the 5th February 2003, two weeks after the 
Marcoussis peace agreement was signed. Local war heroes, commanders and 
                                                 
23  Based on testimonies of victims and eyewitnesses, personal communications. 
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a female soldier dominate the front page in the first issue, but among the 
latest headlines the Linas-Marcoussis agreement is featured: for example, 
“an analysis of the negotiations of Paris and Lomé” and “why the soldiers of 
President Gbagbo are afraid of the application of the peace accords” 
(Doumbia 2003a: 1). The tone and gist of the articles are in line with what 
the rebels said at the time about the Marcoussis accords, which is not sur-
prising. To avoid violent reactions, everything that was uttered publicly in 
the rebel-held parts had to be in accordance with the rebels’ opinion. Obvi-
ously, the local newspaper found the nationally negotiated peace agreement 
relevant enough to comment on in the paper. The local level profits from 
ceasefires reached at the national level and, after all, sustainable peace means 
tackling the problem in its entirety and above the local level. 
Nevertheless, it is physical security that people need most and which 
was their primary concern during and right after the violent conflicts in the 
local arena at the beginning of 2003 (Bauer, Dobler and Förster 2007; Hills 
2009: 7). That people structure their narratives of the violent conflict and its 
aftermath along the gradual improvement of the security situation under-
lines this. I will, therefore, here link the abstract term “peace” with the more 
concrete experience of security to offer an empirical concept of the peace 
process in the local arena, rather than a definition from outside (Mehler 
2008: 38). This ties in with the fact that differentiating the rebels as good 
and bad ones was by far closer to everyday immediate concerns than any 
decision about a power-sharing government made in Paris, whose effect 
might be felt months later, if at all. Reality was dominated by what the rebels 
did and did not do. Two events impacted the security situation and im-
proved people’s living conditions in the local arena in 2003: firstly, the 
Ivorian rebels’ success in chasing the largely Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
mercenaries from Ivorian soil (roughly in April and May 2003); and sec-
ondly, the installation and establishment of the newly appointed rebel leader 
in July 2003 (Doumbia 2003b: 3).  
This rebel leader was the afore-mentioned commander Losseni Fofana. 
He came with his armed men, the Cobras, from Bouaké and gradually estab-
lished their control. The beginning of the rebellion saw much competition 
for positions and resources among different rebel groups. Rivalries claimed 
many deaths among the rebels. To cement their position, rebel leaders had 
to fight those who were not prepared to comply until they had established a 
monopoly on the use of violence in their territory. Gradually, rival rebel 
leaders and their groups were eliminated, subjected or pushed into exile; yet 
there were still some rebels who abused their power and made life unpre-
dictable for people. With this rather complex system of administration de-
scribed above, Losseni Fofana, together with his entourage, has controlled 
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Man ever since. Decisive in the local arena of Man is what the New Forces 
do; this has led to bottom-up forms of power-sharing arrangements, which 
we will turn to now. 
Local Forms of Power-Sharing 
Whereas in the chronology of the conflict, the first part of my article has 
dealt with the first half of the year 2003, the second part is situated in the 
second half of 2003, leading into 2004. Towards the end of 2003, the politi-
cal situation was as follows: The Linas-Marcoussis agreement had never 
been implemented, further rounds of negotiations had not led to a remark-
able improvement either and the divided country was at an armed stalemate. 
The northern part had been without state control or local UN supervision 
for over a year. It is in this context that local forms of power-sharing 
emerged in the local arena.  
When I talk about local forms of power-sharing in this context, it is not 
between the rebels and the government but between the rebels and local 
community leaders and corporations.24 A prerequisite to comprehension is 
to understand how the rebels are viewed by locals. It would lead too far to 
provide a full description, but the statement of a local youth leader will suf-
fice: he said that the rebels gave them a hard time but they were not as bad 
as one might think. 
It goes without saying that not everybody would be acceptable to the 
rebels as a power-sharing partner. In Man, Mamadou Soumahoro Maméry, 
however, was such a person. He belongs to a well-known merchant family 
in Man and has worked for several mayors in various positions. Further-
more, he is the former local leader of the RDR, the political party said to 
have close links to the rebellion. In the eyes of the loyalists in the South, he 
was a rebel and they suspected him of helping the rebellion. He openly says 
that he shares the political aims of the New Forces and that one could have 
seen the war coming, but he does not agree with the means, the violence, 
and particularly the human rights violations against civilians. 
Before the rebellion reached Man, he was arrested at home at night and 
locked up in La MACA (Maison d’arrêt et de correction d’Abengourou/Abidjan), a 
much-feared prison in the capital. After his dramatic liberation from this 
prison, he returned to Man in August 2003. Here, he strived to bring all 
local associations and NGOs together in a civil society organisation, for the 
usual representational bodies of the State had ceased functioning at the 
                                                 
24  It would lead too far here to also address non-permanently institutionalised social 
organisations. 
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outbreak of the violent crisis. Organised in a group and thanks to his per-
sonal history, Maméry Soumahoro was able to address the rebel leadership 
and make claims for the population. Every Thursday, he met Losseni Fofana, 
the FN zone commander, and gave him a general account of things going 
wrong in town. Among other things, he reported the misbehaviour of com-
batants against civilians. The commander was willing to punish the soldiers 
concerned among his men. This affected Maméry Soumahoro, the outspo-
ken critic, in that he was sometimes threatened by young rebels because they 
had been imprisoned due to his objection. 
The fact that a) two sides sit down to talk and make decisions, that b) 
an association is formed which makes claims, and that c) the rebel leadership 
to a certain extent gives up part of its power by being criticised can be inter-
preted as a local form of power-sharing. This political form of power-shar-
ing – in Hartzell and Hoddie’s typology – has lead to a substantial improve-
ment of the security situation and to a more peaceful everyday life for the 
population (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 320). 
Since its beginnings in 2003, the civil society organisation – which in 
this form is unique to the city of Man – has undergone many changes in 
terms of leadership. But it continues its efforts to this day, with Maméry 
Soumahoro in an advisory role. He himself has been offered the position of 
the local representative of the Coalition de la Société Civile pour la Paix et le 
Développement Démocratique en Côte d’Ivoire (COSOPCI), which, among others, 
was founded by human rights associations (LIDHO, MIDH)25 in the capital 
Abidjan in 2004. They have relations to international NGOs, the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Open Society Initiative for 
West Africa (OSIWA), among others. The founding of COSOPCI is a direct 
reaction to the political crisis. Its aim is to work for a peaceful, democratic 
culture. One of the primary tasks is to observe the identification and elec-
toral process. They write reports and, if necessary, they can publicise wrong-
doings via the media in Abidjan. This may also serve as an example that the 
local level is strongly linked to the national and international level. Whereas 
in the first time, during and right after the war, Man was more isolated due 
to frequent breakdowns of communication, these networks today strongly 
contribute to the security situation in the local arena. 
Further forms of local power-sharing can be found between the rebels 
and the remnants of the decentralised state administration. The municipality 
(mairie) – as part of the decentralised institutions and staffed by people from 
that region – has never been closed for long in Man. Deprived of some 
                                                 
25  Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l’Homme (LIDHO), Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains 
(MIDH). 
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functions, they continued work during the crisis in two domains: They kept 
on registering births and handing out certificates and served as an interface 
between the population and the military authorities of the New Forces. As 
before the war, the mayor has spent most of his time in Abidjan, the eco-
nomic capital, but there has always been at least one of the five vice-mayors 
present. One among them, who died recently, is said to have had a particu-
larly good rapport with the New Forces authorities. Although the New 
Forces hold on tightly to their economic revenue system, the mayors have 
successfully negotiated a share in the taxation of the market for the munici-
pality. In a broad understanding of power-sharing, this constitutes another 
informal form of local power-sharing, an economic one, so to speak. 
As a comparison among different zones and towns in the FN-held ar-
eas has revealed (Förster 2009: 331-345), there are remarkable differences 
with respect to security provisions, the administration and taxation system. 
In Korhogo, for example, another local power-sharing arrangement can be 
observed between the dozow (hunter associations) and the New Forces. Only 
the dozow, who are part of the local culture system, are allowed to patrol 
inside the city; the rebels’ domain starts at the roadblocks leading out of the 
city (Förster 2010: 7-13). 
The Implementation of a National Power-Sharing  
Device at the Local Level 
This last part of my paper focuses on the time after the Ouagadougou Peace 
Agreement. One of the most salient changes at the local level was certainly 
the arrival of a new powerful actor, manifested in the return of government-
appointed corps of prefects and sub-prefects whose role in the Ivorian ad-
ministration is generally to represent and promote the president’s politics 
across the country. The redeployment of the state administration was initi-
ated with an official ceremony in Bouaké, the headquarters of the New 
Forces, in June 2007 (The Secretary-General on the United Nations Opera-
tion in Côte d’Ivoire 2007: 6). Although federalism or territorial autonomy 
are usually considered territorial aspects of power-sharing (Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003: 320; Sriram 2008: 22), the redeployment can be interpreted as 
territorial power-sharing at the local level, for it resulted in the spatial co-
habitation of two antagonistic powers.  
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The Redeployed State Administration: Like a Fish  
Without Water 
According to the sub-prefect of Man, the prefect and he returned to the 
region in October 2007. Until the beginning of 2009 they worked in pre-
liminary buildings. Similar to the municipality, their main work was the is-
suing of certificates as part of the identification process. Everything con-
cerning security or taxation, customs and justice was, and continues to be, 
firmly in the hands of the New Forces. 
In order to avoid unnecessary provocation, each side keeps to itself, ac-
cording to the sub-prefect. For official meetings, such as the opening of 
business branches or the celebration of Independence Day, both authorities 
are represented: the prefect and a representative of the zone commander. 
They shake hands, sit next to each other and may share a meal. Certain top-
ics will be strictly avoided because the two representatives would not agree 
with each other. It can be described as a careful coexistence of two parallel 
structures, whose standing is uncertain. The manner in which the local rep-
resentatives of the former belligerents work together is decided on a national 
level. The logic is that as long as Gbagbo and Soro can work together, their 
representatives in the local arena will do the same. In this respect, local ac-
tors follow their hierarchy’s instructions and do not actively bring about 
change from the bottom. It is a top-down approach. On the other hand, 
factional divisions, for example, those between Soro and some of the 
comzones, are well known. It is evident that the prefects are interested in 
having good relations with the FN commanders, for it is the ex-rebels who 
will offer them protection – and not the state – in the case of factional in-
surgency, provided that the local zone commander continues to support 
Soro and the OPA agreement.  
In smaller, more remote towns, such as the sub-prefecture of Podi-
agouiné in the South of Sangouiné in the region Dix-Huit Montagnes, the 
administration came back reluctantly. Residents of Podiagouiné say that 
their sub-prefect came and presented himself to the population by organis-
ing a small ceremony during which two cattle were slaughtered and shared 
together. But after that, he left again. People ask themselves what he was 
meant to be doing in their town, given that he has not much scope of func-
tions and little or no protection in case of a renewed outbreak of violence. 
In the words of one of the youth leaders, the prefect is “like a fish without 
water”. If there is no water, the fish is nothing, he said. The institutions and 
the means the prefect is usually equipped and surrounded with are lacking. 
He cannot act properly. In this respect it does not make a difference 
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whether the prefect is present or not, and therefore the village was not sur-
prised to see their sub-prefect leave again.  
Handover of Administrative Powers to the Prefects:  
The Politics of Small Steps 
For months, people have been talking about the “handover of administra-
tive powers to the prefects”. It had been postponed on 15 January 2009 
following the fourth supplementary OPA agreement from December 2008. 
Finally on 26 May 2009, the comzones handed over their administrative 
functions to government-appointed prefects, in a symbolic act in Bouaké. 
Although many of the ten zone commanders had been expected, only one 
of them was actually present at the ceremony; it was Martin Kouakou Fofié 
from Korhogo, the only zone commander sanctioned by the UN (ICG 
2009: 12). Everybody had envisioned a big change, and that the rebels would 
leave to clear the way for the elections, as originally foreseen in the timetable 
of the Ouagadougou agreement. But people had not reckoned with the 
inventiveness of the Ivorian stakeholders. They are masters of small steps. 
They equated the handover with yet another small step in a peace process 
the outcome of which remains to be seen. Whether or not the goal of the 
trajectory will be the re-establishment of the pre-war state administration 
only time will tell. So far, the comzones have retained their security powers 
and taxation system, which means that the restoration of the civilian state 
authority and the country’s reunification under central control have re-
mained incomplete.  
In Man, no direct handover of administrative powers between the 
comzone and the prefect has taken place (Droh 2009). One FN representa-
tive said: “They have done that in Bouaké for all of us”. In theory, it means 
that all “issues” concerning the person in charge of a region have to be ad-
dressed to the prefects or sub-prefects now. Such issues can be the opening 
of a new branch of a company, the arrival and reception of an official visitor 
or the organisation of a concert. The organiser of a concert, who had been 
in Man during the crisis, informed the zone commander as usual about the 
up-coming event. The zone commander then referred him to the prefecture. 
Only with the prefect’s authorisation are the FN allowed to act under the 
new regulations in public events. If the prefect needs protection when he 
travels in the region, he has to address the zone commander or his acting 
commander. The zone commander has put his soldiers at the prefect’s dis-
posal. It was the concert organiser who decided to give some drinks to the 
FN soldiers who came to provide security at his concert. As the FN chief of 
security assured me, he is in “daily” phone contact with the prefect and 
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there are no problems. 800 mixed Integrated Command Centre soldiers 
(Centre de Commandement Intégré, CCI) are expected to be deployed in the near 
future and the prefect states that only then will the full recovery of his pow-
ers be felt (Droh 2009).26 Prefects have not received the financial and logisti-
cal backing for their work yet (ICG 2009: 15). Houses are still occupied by FN 
foot soldiers, and while the military camps to regroup the soldiers are not 
ready yet, they cannot be put on the streets without risking serious security 
problems in town.  
Seen from the point of view of state and constitutional law, it is contra-
dictory that the prefect regularly calls upon rebels – who are commonly 
referred to as ex-rebels27 – in order to assure the security of state personnel. 
This practice has legitimised rebels as security providers on a national or 
state level, notwithstanding the social reality this everyday practice had be-
come at a local level during the conflict. At least in some of the rebels’ 
minds, they are doing an ordinary job as security providers, worthy of remu-
neration, and their view has been confirmed to a certain extent by the state 
administration working with them. The government, however, does not pay 
them; direct employment would mark the final step. Thus, the signal, that 
rebels and their service as security providers have been recognised by the 
State, and to a certain extent legalised, should not be underestimated. As 
Tull and Mehler argue, rebels are rewarded for using violence and this prac-
tice “thereby creates incentive structures which turn the rebel path into an 
appealing option” for obtaining either professional or even political goals 
and posts (Tull and Mehler 2005: 376). Arguably the resulting mixture of 
security providers – state and non-state actors/former rebels – is the future 
of many African states. 
A next step in the redeployment of the administration was the re-
opening of the Court of Justice in Man in March 2009. However, only part 
of the personnel, including a magistrate, has been deployed, meaning that 
only civil jurisdiction is working. For the criminal jurisdiction, a police force, 
a prison and bailiffs at state command are indispensable. They are waiting 
for the Integrated Command Centre; if and when it is in place, they can 
                                                 
26  This article covers the period until October 2009. Recent developments such as the 
arrival of less than a hundred gendarmes and police officers from the CCI in Man 
in late December 2009 and the plundering and subsequent closure of the Court of 
Justice during the political crisis in February 2010 have not been taken into 
consideration. 
27  The rebels’ participation in the negotiation of peace agreements and their subse-
quent incorporation into power-sharing arrangements, such as the formation of a 
common government, seems to have made their mutation from rebels into ex-re-
bels possible. 
  Power-Sharing in the Local Arena 127
 

 
begin work. At the moment, the police, gendarmerie and prison are still in 
the hands of the New Forces and, as the following example demonstrates, 
they are not ready to surrender their position. 
Due to personal rivalries and disagreements, the New Forces’ warden 
of the prison in Man was put under arrest by the acting zone commander. 
He was kept in custody at the gendarmerie, next to the prison. At the time 
the court had just reopened and the first magistrates had come back. Al-
though the former warden was not able to leave the gendarmerie, he was 
still allowed to have his mobile phone on him and to make calls. However, 
when he called the magistrates to enquire about when they would take over 
their full duties – also over the prison and its occupants – this did not please 
the commanders, so they took his mobile phone from him, locked him in 
prison (his former place of work) and prohibited visits. For the FN, he had 
gone too far by calling upon the official justice system. The New Forces 
commanders asserted their position, their domain, and the consequences of 
interfering in what they consider their rightful affairs.  
Power-sharing has led to a situation in which there is a heterogeneous 
plurality of authorities or power holders present in the local arena who hold 
a fragile power balance today: remnants of the decentralised state admini-
stration, the New Forces, international peacekeepers, government-appointed 
corps of prefects and, most recently, policemen and gendarmes from the 
mixed units. Each group is under a different command which at first gives 
the impression of a patchwork-like structure. The actors’ impact on the lives 
of the population, however, varies significantly. From this perspective, the 
real force in zone 6 are the ex-rebels. Decisive is what they do. The post-
conflict order has not “two heads” (ICG 2009: 12); I would argue that there 
is one dominant head, the FN, and two further heads, the state administra-
tion and the international peacekeepers. 
Conclusion 
This article has described power-sharing arrangements in the local arena of a 
rebel-held, post-war society. The first example dealt with the Linas Mar-
coussis agreement at an early time of the conflict. Whereas the power-shar-
ing provisions in the peace agreement certainly were able to calm the situa-
tion in general, they were unable to address pressing needs for security at the 
local level. This was not a time of power-sharing at the local level, but rather 
the coercive establishment of control under a single command. The initiative 
to restore order and predictability here came from the Ivorian rebels them-
selves, which was an important complement to the peace agreement at the 
national level. 
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In my second example, I looked at local, bottom-up forms of power-
sharing that are unrelated to national power-sharing. Whereas the civilian 
population is often excluded from peace negotiation tables (Mehler 2008: 6), 
it is they who initiate talks in the first place in order to improve concrete 
situations. Those who negotiate are respected insiders and maintain good 
relationships with the power-holders. It is power-sharing between unequal 
partners, between armed and non-armed actors. Respect for each others’ 
positions and knowing one’s limits provide the basis and trust that makes 
power-sharing possible. Last but not least, there is no neutral, third party 
guarantor present in the local arena to watch over these informal arrange-
ments. 
The implementation of the national power-sharing provisions of the 
Ouagadougou Peace Accord brought about a need for territorial power-
sharing at the local level in 2007. For the first time, power was directly 
shared between the former direct enemies, the rebel forces and the state. 
The way power is shared is decided at the national level. The practice at the 
local level shows that the New Forces are in control and tolerate the pres-
ence of the state personnel as long as they keep to their limited space of 
action which is mainly identification in preparation for the elections. 
The examples have shown that Côte d’Ivoire is moving very gradually 
and carefully towards peace. Although the prefects have been redeployed 
and received their administrative powers, no ground-breaking changes had 
taken place at the local level by the end of 2009. The big question at the 
moment is whether the implementation of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord 
is just taking a bit longer than initially planned or whether the country will 
fall back into violence. Nevertheless, it is an important sign that the prefects 
can live side by side and start working towards normalcy with the New 
Forces still in place. It requires trust on the side of the prefects to offer 
themselves without a protection force in situ to their former opponents. On 
the other hand, power-sharing seems to have a rather questionable long-
term effect, because it remains a problematic sign for civilian solutions to 
conflicts that the state works with ex-rebels as security providers. 
The benefits of peace agreements, including power-sharing arrange-
ments, arrive at the local level last, due to the fact that it is a top-down proc-
ess. However, the local arena has its own agency to address immediate 
needs. Local forms of power-sharing provide direct and quick solutions. In 
local power-sharing arrangements, violent actors are socialised into working 
together with civilian actors, and have to step back and compromise (Jarstad 
2008: 106). With their local forms of power-sharing initiatives, local people 
help to re-integrate violent actors into administrative structures governed by 
civilian rules. Arguing normatively in favour of the returning State, one 
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might conclude that these local forms of power-sharing prepare the ground 
for the implementation of top-down peace agreements. However, if we take 
this a step further, beyond a mere restoration of the State, we might argue 
for a new take on post-conflict politics. We may take these local forms of 
power-sharing and political legitimacy as building blocks for future hybrid 
modes of governance. 
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Machtteilung auf lokaler Ebene: Man – eine von Rebellen kontrol-
lierte Stadt im Westen der Côte d’Ivoire 
Zusammenfassung: Im Allgemeinen werden Friedensabkommen, die 
Machtteilungsklauseln vorsehen, im nationalen Rahmen analysiert. Der vor-
liegende Beitrag vermittelt Einsicht in die praktische Wirkung solcher Klau-
seln in lokalem Rahmen, und zwar in der Stadt Man im Westen der Côte 
d’Ivoire. Untersucht wird, wodurch in der umliegenden Region ein Wandel 
hin zum Frieden erreicht werden konnte. Es werden lokale Formen der 
Machtteilung zwischen den führenden Persönlichkeiten lokaler Gemein-
schaften und den Rebellen ermittelt, die ein komplexes Herrschafts- und 
Steuersystem in den von ihnen besetzten Gebieten eingerichtet haben. Zu-
dem wird die Durchführung einer territorialen Machtteilungsregelung unter-
sucht, die auf nationaler Ebene als Bestandteil des Friedensabkommens 
zwischen den Kriegsgegnern ausgehandelt worden war: die Wiedereinset-
zung der staatlichen Verwaltung in den von den Rebellen gehaltenen Ge-
bieten des Landes. Das ethnographische Material, auf dem der Artikel ba-
siert, belegt, dass Akteure auf lokaler Ebene ihre eigenen Strategien haben, 
drängende Bedürfnisse anzugehen, und dass sie eine deutlich aktivere Rolle 
bei der Schaffung von Frieden spielen, als gewöhnlich anerkannt wird. 
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